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A NEW SPLIT ON OLD AGE: PRECLUSION OF
§ 1983 CLAIMS AND THE ADEA
Emer M. Stack*
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) to combat employer bias against older workers and to reject the
idea that the job performance of all employees declines with age. The
ADEA provides a statutory scheme for addressing age discrimination
against employees aged forty years and older. Some older workers, however, have turned instead to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, using § 1983 claims as a means of relief.
A six-to-one circuit split has emerged as to whether the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination or whether an aggrieved older worker can seek relief by means of an equal protection–based § 1983 claim. In
Levin v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit court to conclude that the ADEA does not preclude age discrimination claims brought
pursuant to § 1983. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari in the Levin case and is set to resolve this split in its upcoming
term.
This Note examines the legal conflict surrounding the ADEA’s preclusion
of § 1983 claims. Based on recent developments in the doctrine of implied
preclusion, the ADEA’s language, legislative history, and a comparison of
rights and remedies, this Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt
the approach of the Seventh Circuit and find that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 claims. It suggests that comparisons both of Title VII with the
ADEA, and of age discrimination claims with race discrimination claims
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, further
support this position.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether due to the national economic downturn or perhaps the aging of
the Baby Boomer generation, there are more older men and women striving
to remain in the American workforce.1 As the number of older workers
grows, the problem of age discrimination in the workplace has become increasingly prevalent, and its effects cannot be overstated. Arbitrary age
discrimination results in social costs such as “unused productive hours, social insurance, and welfare programs.”2 These are in addition to the individual’s suffering, as one court observed that “[t]he cumulative effect of an
arbitrary and illegal termination of a useful and productive older employee
is a cruel blow to the dignity and self-respect of one who has devoted his
life to productive work and can take a dramatic toll.”3 In the midst of the
increasing prevalence of age discrimination, various circuit courts have
grappled with the issue of which remedies are available to aggrieved older
workers.
Workers aged forty years and older are protected from age discrimination
in the workplace by statute under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act4 (ADEA). Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 in order to combat
employer bias against older workers and to reject the idea that the job performance of all employees declines with age.5 In addition to the ADEA,
workers are also protected from age discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.6 Some older workers have asserted
1. See Don Lee, More Older Workers Making Up Labor Force, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 4,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/04/business/la-fi-labor-seniors-20120903. Lee
states that “many older Americans are delaying retirement and being added to the workforce
in record numbers. Nearly 1 in 5 Americans ages 65 and older are working or looking for
jobs—the highest in almost half a century.” Id.
2. BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 4 (2003).
3. Id. at 5 (quoting Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 329
(D.N.J. 1975)).
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006); see
infra Part I.B.ii.
5. See infra Part I.B.i.
6. See infra Part I.E.
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equal protection claims7 via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in place of a claim under the
ADEA.8 Recently, a circuit split has emerged as to whether state and local
government employees may only bring age discrimination claims under the
ADEA or whether such workers can seek relief by bringing age discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause through § 1983.
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit confronted the issue of ADEA exclusivity in
Levin v. Madigan9 and became the first circuit court to conclude that the
ADEA does not preclude age discrimination claims brought pursuant to
§ 1983.10 As a result, the Seventh Circuit permitted the plaintiff in that case
to pursue equal protection–based age discrimination claims under § 1983
even though the plaintiff could not proceed under the ADEA.11 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit knowingly created a six-to-one circuit split with
other circuit courts,12 which have held that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.13 On March 18, 2013, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in the Levin case in order to
resolve this conflict.14 The Court is poised to hear Levin in its upcoming
October 2013 Term.15
This Note examines the legal conflict surrounding the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983 claims. Based on changes in the implied preclusion doctrine
since the earliest ADEA exclusivity cases and an analysis of the ADEA’s
language, legislative history, and a comparison of rights and remedies provided by each statute, this Note argues that the Seventh Circuit was correct
in finding that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 claims. It suggests that
parallels between Title VII and the ADEA, along with a comparison of age
and race discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause, further
support this position.
Part I of this Note examines the problem of age discrimination and then
outlines the ADEA, including its provisions, legislative history, and relationship with other federal statutes. Part I also explores the provisions and
legislative history of § 1983, and analyzes the standard for finding preclusion of § 1983 claims under the implied preclusion doctrine. Part II of this
Note focuses on the circuit split over whether the ADEA is the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination claims. Finally, Part III suggests that the
Supreme Court should conclude that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983
claims.

7. See infra notes 122–34 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II. Section 1983 is a federal statute that provides a cause of action to
remedy violations of federally guaranteed rights caused by the actions of a state official.
9. 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012).
10. See id. at 617.
11. See id. at 610.
12. See id. at 616.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. Madigan v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013).
15. See Lyle Denniston, Court Grants Three Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 18, 2013, 9:37
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/court-grants-three-cases-2/.
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I. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES: THE ADEA, § 1983 CLAIMS, AND
EVALUATING EXCLUSIVITY
Part I of this Note explores three topics at the core of this circuit split:
the ADEA, § 1983, and the implied preclusion doctrine. Part I begins by
introducing the issue of age discrimination, followed by an overview of the
ADEA. Next, Part I describes § 1983’s history, its key provisions, and how
it is used to bring a constitutional age discrimination claim. Finally, Part I
details the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the implied preclusion doctrine, which governs the analysis of whether a statutory scheme is an exclusive remedy that forecloses other remedies.
A. An Introduction to the Problem of Age Discrimination
This section explores how the issue of age discrimination has grown in
recent years, and examines the biases that lead to age discrimination. First,
this section provides an overview of statistics that show that Americans are
living and working longer while also filing more formal complaints alleging
age discrimination. Next, the section identifies the biases and financial
concerns that often cause employers to engage in discriminatory actions and
implement discriminatory policies in the workplace.
1. Statistical Evidence of a Growing Problem
In general, Americans are living longer and, simultaneously, the effects
of aging are occurring later.16 According to the Administration on Aging,
the population of Americans aged sixty-five or older totaled 40.4 million in
2010, an increase of approximately 5.4 million over the previous decade.17
While people over age sixty-five constituted 13.0 percent of the American
population in 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services estimates that such persons will constitute 20.2 percent of the population by
2050.18
At the same time, there are more older men and women in the workforce.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the number of workers over
age sixty-five increased by 101 percent between 1977 and 2007.19 Furthermore, the number of workers between ages sixty-five and seventy-four
is predicted to grow by 83.4 percent between 2006 and 2016.20
16. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 2, at 4.
17. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. ON AGING, A PROFILE OF OLDER
AMERICANS: 2011 (February 2012), available at http://www.aoa.gov/aoaroot/aging_
statistics/Profile/2011/2.aspx.
18. GRAYSON K. VINCENT & VICTORIA A. VELKOFF, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE
NEXT FOUR DECADES, THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 TO 2050, at 7
(May 2010), available at http://www.aoa.gov/AoARoot/Aging_Statistics/future_growth/
DOCS/p25-1138.pdf.
19. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ARE THERE MORE SENIORS IN
(July 2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2008/
THE WORKPLACE?
older_workers/.
20. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, PROJECTED GROWTH IN LABOR
FORCE PARTICIPATION BY SENIORS, 2006–2016 (July 2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/
opub/ted/2008/jul/wk4/art04.htm/.
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Along with this marked increase in the general aged population and the
percentage of aged workers, the problem of age discrimination in the workplace has also grown. This trend is reflected by the rising number of age
discrimination related charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). While 15,785 age discrimination charges were
filed in 1997, the number of claims filed in 2011 totaled 23,465, demonstrating an almost 50 percent increase over that time period.21 This “graying” of the American workforce, coupled with the rise in age discrimination
claims, heightens the need for effective means of remedying these claims in
the workplace.
2. Commonly Held Biases Against Older Workers
Age discrimination in the workplace is not a new phenomenon.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, employers made such discrimination explicit through the establishment of workplace policies requiring
retirement of older workers by a certain age and the use of job postings that
specified the desired age of prospective applicants.22 Age discrimination
persists in the workplace today even though the ADEA’s enactment prohibited it in 1967.23 Older workers often experience adverse employment decisions due to commonly held notions about age that are either false or
rooted in stereotypes.24 Employers may assume that older workers are experiencing mental or physical deterioration when in fact this may not be the
case.25 Furthermore, employers may perceive older workers as resistant to
change and generally inferior to younger workers, who may be viewed as
having more energy or willingness to work hard.26 Rapid technological innovations have only served to reinforce stereotypes against older workers,
who can be perceived as less skilled at using new technology and unable or
unwilling to learn.27
Financial concerns may also motivate employers to hold biases against
older workers: employers may not want to pay the higher salaries that older
workers can command, or they may fear that older workers will cost them
more in health and retirement benefits.28 Additionally, employers may be
unwilling to invest resources in training an older worker when they perceive

21. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2012, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
22. See Joanna N. Lahey, How Do Age Discrimination Laws Affect Older Workers?,
WORK OPPORTUNITIES FOR OLDER AMS. (CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. B.C., Chestnut Hill,
Mass.), Oct. 2006, at 1, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/
01/wob_5.pdf; see also RAYMOND F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE: OLD AT A YOUNG AGE 6 (2001).
23. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
24. See GREGORY, supra note 22, at 5.
25. See id.
26. See Vincent J. Roscigno et al., Age Discrimination, Social Closure and Employment,
86 SOC. F. 313, 314–15 (2007).
27. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 2, at 4–5.
28. See Roscigno et al., supra note 26, at 315.
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that younger employees will provide a higher return on that investment.29
As a result of such stereotyping, older workers may suffer adverse employment actions, such as termination or failure to be hired or promoted, or
face other consequences like involuntarily exit from the labor market.30
B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: History, Key
Provisions, and Subsequent Amendments
This section provides an overview of the ADEA, first considering the
history of its enactment, and then reviewing its key provisions. This section
then discusses amendments to the ADEA that expanded the scope of its
coverage. Last, the section concludes with a brief explanation of the
ADEA’s relationship to § 1983.
1. Legislative History of the ADEA
Although there were proposals to address age discrimination in employment as early as the 1950s,31 the issue gained national prominence during
the congressional debate over Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).32 Efforts to protect age under Title VII were ultimately unsuccessful, as the House of Representatives rejected Representative John Dowdy’s
proposed amendment to add “age” as an additional protected class.33 The
Senate also voted down a comparable proposal by Senator George
Smathers.34 At the time of these proposals, Congress felt it could not create
legislation because it had “woefully insufficient information”35 about the
issue of age discrimination in the workplace.36 As a result, Title VII contained a provision directing the Secretary of Labor to “make a full and
complete study of factors which might tend to result in discrimination in
employment because of age and of the consequences of such discrimination
on the economy and individuals affected.”37

29. See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 231–33 (1990).
30. See Roscigno et al., supra note 26, at 315.
31. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983) (reviewing congressional efforts
to address the problem of arbitrary age discrimination); see also Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong. 23 (1967) (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits) (“Since 1957 I have been proposing in the Senate legislation to deal with the problem of age discrimination in
employment.”).
32. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 2, at 5; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (2006).
33. See 110 CONG. REC. 2596–99 (1964).
34. See id. at 9911–13, 13,420–92.
35. See id. at 2596 (statement of Rep. Celler).
36. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 229.
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (1964); see
also Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 229–30.
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The Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, issued a report to Congress on
age discrimination in the workplace in June of 1965.38 In his report, Secretary Wirtz recommended that Congress adopt “[a] clear-cut and implemented Federal policy . . . [that] would provide a foundation for a much needed
vigorous, nationwide campaign to promote hiring on the basis of ability rather than age.”39 After reviewing this report, Congress directed the Secretary of Labor to submit legislative proposals prohibiting discrimination
based on age in 1966.40 In his Older Americans Message on January 23,
1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson urged Congress to adopt a solution to
the age discrimination problem, stating, “We must end arbitrary age limits
on hiring.”41 Later that same year, a draft of a bill was submitted. 42
Thereafter, Congress engaged in its own studies, and both the House of
Representatives and the Senate conducted hearings on the proposed legislation.43 The resulting congressional report brought about the enactment of
the ADEA in 1967.44 According to its preamble, the ADEA was enacted
“to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age” and “to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.”45 Additionally, the ADEA was intended “to help employers and workers find ways
of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment,”
stemming from deterioration in skills, morale, and employer acceptability.46
Emphasizing the individual and social costs of age discrimination, “[t]he
original intent of the drafters of what was to become the ADEA was merely
to accord age the same protected status as that extended to race and sex under Title VII.”47 In this way, Title VII had a clear influence on the structure
and provisions of the ADEA. As for the remedial scheme, however, Congress modeled much of the ADEA on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA).48 Therefore, the ADEA has been deemed “a hybrid: part Title
VII, part FLSA.”49

38. WILLARD WIRTZ, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER—AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS
UNDER § 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, H.R. REP. NO. 805 (1965).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 805, at 226.
40. See Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1966, § 606, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80
Stat. 845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (2006)).
41. 113 CONG. REC. 1377, 34,743–44 (1967).
42. See id. at 1377.
43. Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong. 23 (1967); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor,
90th Cong. (1967); see also Hearings on Ret. and the Individual Before the Sen. Special
Comm. on Aging, 90th Cong. (1967).
44. JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 2 (1986).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006).
46. Id.
47. See KALET, supra note 44, at 2.
48. See id. at 3; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19.
49. See id.; see also infra Part I.C.
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2. Key Provisions of the ADEA
The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee
who is at least forty years old on the basis of the employee’s age.50 Discriminatory acts may include failing or refusing to hire a covered individual, terminating him or her, or taking other adverse employment actions with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on
the basis of age.51
The ADEA requires aggrieved older workers to file a charge with the
EEOC,52 the agency responsible for the enforcement of all federal employment discrimination laws.53 In this way, an aggrieved older worker may
not proceed directly to court under the ADEA without first fulfilling the
prerequisite of exhausting this administrative process.54 The worker must
file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the date
on which the alleged age discrimination occurred.55 In states that have their
own administrative agencies for handling discrimination claims, the charge
must be filed within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.56 Upon receiving the charge, the EEOC will notify the parties involved, including prospective defendants, and seek to resolve the dispute by informal methods
such as conciliation, conference, and persuasion.57 The aggrieved worker
may not file a lawsuit pursuant to the ADEA until sixty days after the filing
of a charge with the EEOC.58
An employer, for the purposes of the ADEA, is a person engaged in an
industry affecting interstate commerce with twenty or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year.59 The ADEA also covers the employer’s
agents,60 as well as states, state subdivisions, and interstate agencies.61 Labor unions and employment agencies are similarly prohibited from engaging in age-based discrimination.62
If an employer is found to have violated the provisions of the ADEA, the
court may compel employment of the older worker or order reinstatement
or promotion.63 Additionally, the employer may be required to pay unpaid
minimum wages or overtime compensation.64 The ADEA also provides
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). The ADEA protects employees who are at least forty years
of age. See id. Therefore, the ADEA confers no protections on persons under the age of forty. See id.
51. See id. § 623(a)(1).
52. See id. § 626(d)(1).
53. See GREGORY, supra note 22, at 183.
54. See 29 U.S.C. § 621.
55. See id. § 626 (d)(1).
56. See id. § 626(d)(2).
57. See id.
58. See id. § 626(d).
59. See id. § 630(b).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. § 623(c).
63. See id. § 626(b).
64. See id.
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that liquidated damages are available in cases of willful violations,65 and
under a provision of the FLSA incorporated into the ADEA, the amount of
liquidated damages is equal to the amount of actual damages.66
3. Subsequent Amendments to the ADEA
As it was originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA did not apply to the federal government, the states or their political subdivisions, or to employers
with fewer than twenty-five employees.67 In 1973, a Senate committee became concerned with the gap in coverage for governmental employees, remarking, “‘There is . . . evidence that, like the corporate world, government
managers also create an environment where young is somehow better than
old.’”68 In 1974, Congress amended the ADEA to expand the scope of the
statute’s coverage and close the gap.
Notably, the 1974 amendments to the ADEA modified the definition of
“employer.” According to the amendment, employers also included a state,
any agency of the state, and any interstate agency.69 Most federal employees were also given ADEA rights under the 1974 amendments.70 In EEOC
v. Wyoming,71 the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of the 1974
amendment and concluded that the “extension of the ADEA to cover state
and local governments, both on its face and as applied in this case, was a
valid exercise of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause.”72 The
Court reasoned that the amendment did not “directly impair” a state government’s ability to “structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions,” and so the amendment did not violate principles
of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.73
Later, in 1978, Congress raised the ADEA’s age ceiling for state, local,
and private employees from age sixty-five to seventy and altogether removed the age ceiling for federal workers.74 Taken together, this series of
amendments tends to show that Congress was motivated to make the protections of the ADEA available to a broader range of employees in comparison to the statute as it was originally enacted.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.
See id. § 216(b).
See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 233 (1983).
Id. (quoting S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, 93d Cong., IMPROVING THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION LAW 14 (Comm. Print 1973)).
69. See Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259 § 28(a)(2),
88 Stat. 55, 74 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (2006)).
70. See id. (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)).
71. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
72. Id. at 243.
73. Id. at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95256 § 3, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(b)); Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 233 n.5.
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4. The ADEA on Preclusion of § 1983 Claims
The ADEA simply provides a mechanism for enforcing the substantive
rights it creates. The language of the ADEA does not expressly mention
§ 1983 claims, nor does it purport to provide a remedy for incursions on
federal constitutional rights. Additionally, the legislative history does not
reflect an explicit intent to foreclose the possibility of § 1983 claims of age
discrimination. What one should infer from this silence is at the heart of the
debate over the exclusivity of the ADEA.
C. The ADEA’s Relationship to Title VII and the FLSA:
Finding the Proper Analogy
While the ADEA is substantively similar to Title VII, its remedial provisions track those of the FLSA. This raises the question of whether courts
should interpret the ADEA by analogy to Title VII or the FLSA. This section discusses the relationship between the ADEA and both Title VII and
the FLSA, as well as how courts have approached the issue of preclusion of
§ 1983 claims by Title VII and the FLSA.
1. Title VII and Its Relationship with the ADEA
The ADEA was largely modeled after Title VII, both in terms of substantive provisions and overall purpose.75 Title VII makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against employees because of an “individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”76 Among these prohibited bases for employment discrimination, eliminating racial discrimination
against African Americans was of particular concern to legislators when enacting Title VII.77 Notably, although there was some support for including
discrimination based on age, it was not prohibited under Title VII.78
The purpose and language of the ADEA mirrors that of Title VII in many
ways. In particular, the antidiscrimination language of each statute is practically identical.79 In fact, certain language of the ADEA was “derived in
haec verba from Title VII.”80 Title VII prohibits discrimination “because
of”81 race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and so too does the

75. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (“Since the ADEA and
Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, since
the language of § 14(b) [of the ADEA] is almost in haec verba with § 706(c) [of Title VII],
and since the legislative history of § 14(b) indicates that its source was § 706(c), we may
properly conclude that Congress intended that the construction of § 14(b) should follow that
of § 706(c).”).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2).
77. See Katherine Krupa Green, Comment, A Reason To Discriminate: Curtailing the
Use of Title VII Analysis in Claims Arising Under the ADEA, 65 LA. L. REV. 411, 414 (2005)
(noting that the legislative history of Title VII indicates Congress was primarily interested in
eliminating employment discrimination against African Americans).
78. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 2, at 5.
79. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
80. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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ADEA prohibit discrimination “because of” age.82 In light of the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII, courts have applied their interpretations of Title VII equally to the ADEA. For example, in Oscar Mayer &
Co. v. Evans,83 the Supreme Court held that § 14(b) of the ADEA, mandating that a claimant not bring suit in federal court unless he or she has exhausted appropriate state administrative proceedings, should be interpreted
so as to mirror Title VII § 706(c), which served as a template for § 14(b).84
In so holding, the Court recognized that the ADEA and Title VII “share a
common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace.”85 As
a result of these similarities in statutory language and purpose, courts have
traditionally interpreted the ADEA by analogy to Title VII.86
Nevertheless, there are instances in which the ADEA differs from Title
VII and in which Title VII has been interpreted differently than the
ADEA.87 For example, not all theories of discrimination on which a Title
VII plaintiff may predicate his or her claim are wholly equivalent to those
available under the ADEA. One such theory of discrimination is disparate
impact, which holds that employment discrimination occurs when a facially
neutral employment practice impacts a particular group more adversely than
another and cannot otherwise be justified by a legitimate business necessity.88 In Smith v. City of Jackson,89 the Supreme Court held that disparate
impact claims are available under the ADEA, though they are much narrower in scope than disparate impact claims available under Title VII.90
Unlike Title VII, the ADEA creates an exception under which an employer
will not be liable for discrimination resulting from a facially-neutral employment action if that action is based on “‘reasonable factors other than
age.’”91 Equivalent limiting language does not exist in Title VII, so evaluating a claim based on disparate impact theory under the ADEA does not
operate in the same way as a disparate impact theory under Title VII.92
Furthermore, the nature of the discrimination prohibited by the ADEA
and that prohibited by Title VII are not entirely interchangeable.93 The
comparison between race and age illustrates this observation. Secretary
Wirtz remarked on this distinction in his report that informed and motivated

82. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
83. 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
84. See id. at 753–54.
85. Id. at 756.
86. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 2, at 419; Green, supra note 77, at 418–19.
87. See Green, supra note 77, at 423.
88. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609–10 (1993) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977)).
89. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
90. See id. at 240.
91. See id. at 233–34 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
92. See id.
93. For a discussion of antidiscrimination principles and some difficulties associated
with analogizing race and age, see generally Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not
Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U.
RICH. L. REV. 839 (2004).
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the enactment of the ADEA.94 He found that age discrimination, unlike
race discrimination, is not motivated by “dislike or intolerance of the older
worker,” but rather is predicated on “unsupported general assumptions
about the effect of age on ability.”95 This is in contrast to race discrimination, which is generally thought of as being motivated by intolerance of and
animus toward a racial group.96
In addition to the idea that race and age discrimination are predicated on
different motivations, the nature of race is different than age. Race is an
immutable characteristic and can never lawfully be relevant to an employer’s decisionmaking process.97 In comparison, the ADEA protects age, a
characteristic that some courts have observed is not necessarily immutable
or merely temporal.98 As to immutability, the state of being over forty—the
protected class under the ADEA—is involuntary, permanent, and discrete,
just as race. The most significant difference between age and race, therefore, is that age is sometimes relevant in employment decisions. The
ADEA provides that an employer can assert a defense to a claim of age discrimination by showing that age is a “bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.”99
Additionally, the unequal treatment of older employees in the workplace
cannot realistically be said to equal the longstanding history of invidious
discrimination against workers of color, both in the workplace and in other
aspects of public and private life.
As to the issue of preclusion under Title VII, courts have held that Title
VII is not an exclusive remedy. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,100
the Supreme Court concluded that a private employee alleging race discrimination may still seek relief under Title VII even after first pursuing his
grievance through a collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration process.101 In so holding, the Alexander Court observed that
the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII
and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference is that
Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws
and institutions relating to employment discrimination.102

94. See WILLARD WIRTZ, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER—AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS
UNDER § 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, H.R. REP. NO. 805, at 5 (1965).
95. See id. at 5.
96. See id. at 6.
97. See William R. Bryant, Justifiable Discrimination: The Need for a Statutory Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification Defense for Race Discrimination, 33 GA. L. REV. 211, 213–
18 (1998) (discussing exclusion of a bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ) defense
for race).
98. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 n.4 (6th Cir. 1975) (“The progression of age is a universal human process.”).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006).
100. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
101. See id. at 49.
102. Id. at 48–49.
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The Supreme Court specifically mentioned § 1983 as one such “parallel
or overlapping remed[y]” to the ADEA.103 Therefore, Title VII is not an
exclusive remedy for the types of employment discrimination it prohibits.
2. The FLSA and Its Relationship with the ADEA
The ADEA was also modeled, in part, on the FLSA. The FLSA is a federal statute that “sets forth employment rules concerning minimum wages,
maximum hours, and overtime pay” and prohibits employers from discharging any employee because that employee has filed a complaint alleging a
violation of the statute’s provisions.104
The ADEA incorporates the FLSA’s enforcement and remedial provisions into its own. The ADEA incorporates §§ 211(b), 216, and 217 of the
FLSA.105 Sections 209 and 215 of the FLSA are also incorporated by reference.106 The Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons noted that
“[a]mounts owing . . . as a result of a violation” of the ADEA are to be
treated as “unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation”
under the FLSA and the rights created by the ADEA are to be “enforced
in accordance with the powers, remedies and procedures” of specified
sections of the FLSA.107

Nevertheless, the ADEA permits courts to also “grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the
ADEA].”108
On exclusivity, the FLSA has been interpreted as “the sole remedy available to the employee for enforcement of whatever rights he may have under
the FLSA.”109 However, the issue of preclusion in those cases arose in the
context of a violation of rights conferred by the FLSA itself. The FLSA has
not been interpreted to preclude § 1983 claims to vindicate rights stemming
from an independent source, such as the Constitution. The issue of whether
the FLSA also forecloses similar yet independently sourced constitutional
claims remains unanswered. This is not surprising considering that the
FLSA “did not create a statutory right which arguably was already guaranteed by the Constitution.”110 Because of this, some courts have maintained
that the “FLSA is not particularly helpful in determining the effect of a statute upon prior constitutional claims.”111

103. Id. at 47 n.7.
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131
S. Ct. 1325, 1329 (2011).
105. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
106. See id. § 626(a)–(b).
107. 434 U.S. 575, 578–79 (1978) (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
109. Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(emphasis added); see also Zombro v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir.
1989).
110. Christie v. Marston, 451 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
111. Id.
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D. Section 1983: Purpose and Scope
Government employees may attempt to bring a constitutional age discrimination claim instead of bringing a claim under the ADEA. Age discrimination by a public employer has been held to be a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.112 To bring this
type of constitutional claim, an employee would bring an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.113
1. History of § 1983
Section 1983 was originally enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871114 during the Reconstruction Era “for the express purpose of
‘enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.’”115 Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in order to rid the nation of the violent
hostility and discrimination against African Americans in the post–Civil
War era.116 The Thirteenth Amendment (prohibiting slavery), the Fourteenth Amendment (declaring African Americans citizens of the United
States and guaranteeing them the right to due process and equal protection
under the law), and the Fifteenth Amendment (granting all citizens the right
to vote), were all added to the Constitution after the Civil War.117 Despite
these new constitutional guarantees, groups like the Ku Klux Klan terrorized African Americans to ensure that they remained marginalized in society.118
Because states could not, or refused to, control the wave of violence and
enforce the laws, Congress was concerned about the insecurity of life and
property in the southern states.119 Therefore,
while the Klan itself provided the principal catalyst for the legislation, the
remedy created in [section 1 of the Civil Rights Act] ‘was not a remedy
against [the Klan] or its members but against those who representing a
State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law.’120

112. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000) (holding that states
may not discriminate based on age if the age classification in question is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
113. In relevant part, § 1983 provides, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
114. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 187 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 25 n.15 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13).
116. See Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 187.
117. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 293–94
(4th ed. 2011).
118. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1973).
119. See id. at 426; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
120. Carter, 409 U.S. at 426 (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175–
76).
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In this way, the essential purpose of § 1983 is to provide a remedy for violations of federally guaranteed rights, with a special focus on the perceived
evil of abuse at the hands of states or state actors.121
2. Section 1983’s General Provisions
Section 1983 provides private individuals with a means of enforcing federal rights conferred by federal statutes and the Constitution.122 To enforce
those rights, § 1983 provides a cause of action to remedy violations of a
federal statutory or constitutional right that are committed by any person
acting “under color of . . . State [law].”123
The color of law element of a § 1983 claim has been interpreted to mean
that the defendant has abused power “possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law.”124 Individual public officers,125 municipalities, and local government bodies126 are among those who may be liable under § 1983. Section 1983 also permits a plaintiff to sue individuals such as state and local
officers acting in their personal capacity.127 Overall, to act “under color of
state law,” the defendant’s conduct must be “otherwise chargeable to the
State.”128
A cause of action under § 1983 also requires deprivation of a federally
guaranteed right. Providing a remedy for incursions on constitutional rights
is clearly a key concern of § 1983, but the text of § 1983 also provides a
remedy for violations of federal statutory rights. By the language of the
statute itself, § 1983 also creates a remedy for violations secured by the
laws of the United States.129 The Supreme Court concluded in Maine v.
Thiboutot130 that the laws covered by § 1983 are not limited to any subset
of laws in light of the fact that “Congress attached no modifiers” to that
language in the statute.131
Section 1983, however, does not create any independent rights. It may
only be invoked when the plaintiff has been deprived of a right identified
and conferred by a separate federal statute or the Constitution.132 It follows, then, that § 1983 claims cannot be used to enforce rights conferred by

121. See Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 188.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
123. See id.
124. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
125. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974).
126. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 660–61 (1978).
127. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 2, at 829; see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 23 (1991).
128. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
129. Section 1983 refers to the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added).
130. 448 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1980) (holding that § 1983 may be used to bring a claim of a violation of rights conferred by the Social Security Act).
131. Id. at 4.
132. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 2, at 826–27.
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those statutes such as the ADEA that already provide their own comprehensive remedial scheme.133
As to remedies, § 1983 states that those who infringe on a federally guaranteed right “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”134 This implies that various
forms of remedy are available to plaintiffs in a § 1983 suit.135 A § 1983 action may be defended or limited by a number of restrictions.136 These include the defenses of qualified or absolute immunity for some government
officials as well as the doctrine of preclusion.137
E. Age Discrimination As an Equal Protection Claim
Age discrimination may violate an individual’s rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.138 The Equal Protection
Clause states, “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”139 When a litigant asserts an equal protection claim, the basic inquiry is whether the government, in drawing a distinction among people based on a certain characteristic, can identify a sufficiently important purpose for that discrimination.140 Whether a sufficient
justification exists depends on the basis for the government’s distinction, as
courts are more suspicious of certain classifications.141
For example, racial classifications are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to the most searching review, strict scrutiny.142 Under strict
scrutiny, a law that discriminates based on a suspect class, such as race or
national origin, will be upheld only if the government can show that the law
serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.143 A less searching review, called intermediate scrutiny, is applied
when reviewing classifications based on gender, for example.144 Finally,
133. See id. at 827; see also Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617–
18 (1979).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
135. See Jacob E. Meyer, “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings”: The Procedural Nature of
Comprehensive Remedial Scheme Preclusion in § 1983 Claims, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 415, 420–21 (2009).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000) (holding that states
may not discriminate based on age if the age classification in question is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 685; see also, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 135 (2011) (“The government must
simply justify any legal distinction between individuals with a sufficient rationale.”).
141. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 686; Strauss, supra note 140, at 135–36.
142. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). In
Adarand, the Supreme Court held that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Id.
143. See id.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). In Virginia, to survive
intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court stated that a state must show that its gender classi-
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the least searching review of laws challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause is known as the rational basis test.145 Under rational basis review, a
court will uphold a law if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.146 Unlike strict scrutiny, the purpose need not be compelling, nor
does the scheme need to be narrowly tailored; the scheme chosen simply
must be a rational way to achieve the government purpose.147
To determine the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Supreme Court has
considered several factors.148 One such factor is whether the government
bases its classification on an immutable characteristic, as it would be unfair
to discriminate on the basis of a condition that one did not choose.149 This
is, in part, why race and national origin are subject to strict scrutiny. A second factor is whether the group discriminated against is able to protect itself through the political process.150 Finally, the Court also considers the
history of discrimination against the group in question.151
The Supreme Court has held that age classifications are subject only to
rational basis review.152 This is because age is not a suspect classification
under the Equal Protection Clause.153 In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the Court justified its application of rational basis review as
follows:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of
discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced
a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative
of their abilities.154

Because the Massachusetts law at issue, mandating retirement for police officers over fifty years old, was rationally related to the State’s objective to

fication is needed to achieve an important state interest, and it must also provide exceedingly
persuasive evidence of its justification for that state interest. Id.
145. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 688; Strauss, supra note 140, at 136 (describing rational basis review as “highly deferential to the legislative judgment”).
146. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause was violated when a state law designed to prohibit the legislature from protecting homosexual individuals from discrimination could not be said to have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest).
147. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 688.
148. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
that “more searching judicial inquiry” may be required when a law is directed at “discrete
and insular minorities,” or “curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities”).
149. See id.; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 688. See generally Strauss, supra note
140, at 161–65 (describing treatment of immutability within the courts).
150. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at
688.
151. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 688.
152. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976).
153. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Murgia, 427
U.S. at 313.
154. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
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promote public safety by ensuring physically fit police officers, the Murgia
Court held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.155
Even though age is not a suspect class and classifications based on age
are only subject to rational basis review, this does not mean that the aged do
not have rights under the Equal Protection Clause.156 However, practically
speaking, “[i]n cases where a classification burdens neither a suspect group
nor a fundamental interest, courts are quite reluctant to overturn governmental action on the ground that it denies equal protection of the laws.”157
In that sense, employees may find it difficult to succeed on a claim asserting age discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
F. A Remedial Black Hole: Qualified Immunity
When a state or local government employee asserts a claim of age discrimination in the workplace under the ADEA, the employer may raise the
issue of Eleventh Amendment qualified immunity as a bar to the lawsuit.
The Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state.”158 The Eleventh Amendment
has been interpreted to mean that individuals cannot sue a state without its
consent.159 To determine whether a federal statute makes a state subject to
suit, the Supreme Court has “applied a simple but stringent test: ‘Congress
may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in
federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”160
Applying this test in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,161 the Supreme
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars any ADEA lawsuit by an individual against a state because “Congress did not validly abrogate the
States’ sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals.”162 Therefore,
under the ADEA, a state employee does not have a damages cause of action
against her state employer. The Kimel court did not, however, speak to the
specific issue of § 1983 suits by individuals against states or state actors.
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, emphasized that state employees
experiencing age discrimination by state employers could find recourse using other means, including state age discrimination statutes.163 As a result
of Kimel, the damages remedy Congress wanted to provide for state em-

155. See id. at 314–15.
156. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000).
157. Ashcroft, 501 U.S at 470–71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
159. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
160. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
161. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
162. See id. at 91.
163. See id. at 91–92.
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ployees through its 1974 amendments to ADEA164 is limited, and state employees suing under the ADEA do not have a damages remedy.165
G. Standard for Preclusion of § 1983 by a
Comprehensive Statutory Scheme
The Supreme Court has set forth guiding principles for analyzing whether a federal statute provides the exclusive remedy for a wrong or an injury
that another statute also seems to address. According to the implied preclusion doctrine, when a federal statute provides remedies that are deemed
“sufficiently comprehensive,” the Supreme Court may infer that Congress
intended to preclude plaintiffs from relying on § 1983 to provide additional
or alternative remedies.166 When deciding an issue of preclusion, the Supreme Court cautioned in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority167 that it would not “‘lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy’ for the deprivation of a
federally secured right.”168
1. Preclusion of § 1983 Claims To Enforce
Federal Statutory Rights
The Supreme Court originally recognized the implied preclusion doctrine
in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers.169 In
Sea Clammers, the plaintiffs brought a suit for damages via § 1983 under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act170 (FWPCA) and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972171 (MPRSA). Notably, the
purpose of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 suit was to vindicate federal statutory
rights, not a right conferred by the Constitution. The Supreme Court held
that such a suit for damages could not be brought pursuant to § 1983.172
In its analysis of § 1983 preclusion, the Court stated, “When the remedial
devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they
may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of
suits under § 1983.”173 The Court also stated that “when ‘a state official is
164. See Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 74 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)); see also
supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
165. See Mustafa v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 196 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955 (D. Neb. 2002)
(stating that the practical effect of ADEA exclusivity coupled with the Kimel decision is
“elimination of all age discrimination claims made against state actors in federal court”).
166. See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981).
167. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
168. Id. at 423–24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. See also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Misinterpreting “Sounds of Silence”: Why
Courts Should Not “Imply” Congressional Preclusion of § 1983 Constitutional Claims, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 783 (2008).
170. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
171. Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. and 33 U.S.C.).
172. See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981).
173. Id.
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alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983.’”174 In
other words, when the remedies provided by a particular statute are comprehensive, it may be inferred that Congress intended to preclude individuals from bringing § 1983 claims.
Both the FWPCA and the MPRSA set forth “quite comprehensive” enforcement schemes, including citizen-suit provisions that allow private citizens to sue for prospective relief, as well as notice provisions requiring
plaintiffs to notify the Environmental Protection Agency, the State, and the
alleged violator as a prerequisite to filing suit.175 Because of the unusually
elaborate enforcement provisions of the statutes, the Sea Clammers Court
reasoned that parallel § 1983 claims would thwart congressional intent and
thus held that § 1983 suits were precluded.
Many years after its decision in Sea Clammers, the Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff’s attempt to assert a federal statutory right under § 1983 in
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams.176 In Rancho Palos Verdes, the plaintiff
filed suit seeking an injunction under the Communications Act of 1934, as
added by the Telecommunications Act of 1996177 (TCA) and sought damages and attorney’s fees via §§ 1983 and 1988.178 Like Sea Clammers,
Rancho Palos Verdes also involved a plaintiff that used § 1983 to enforce
rights conferred by a federal statutory scheme. The Court noted, “The provision of an express, private means of redress in the statute itself is ordinarily an indication that Congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983.”179 The TCA imposed limits on the authority of
state and local governments to regulate wireless communications facilities.180 Furthermore, under the TCA, the local government is required to
provide a written decision, supported by substantial evidence, in response to
requests for permits.181 An individual may seek judicial review of the decision within thirty days of its issuance, and the court is required to hear and
decide the case on an expedited basis.182 The TCA further provides that a
plaintiff may not be entitled to compensatory damages or attorney’s fees.183
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the TCA was a sufficiently
comprehensive scheme, and Congress did not intend for the TCA to coexist
with § 1983 claims.184 Thus, the Court held the TCA was an exclusive
remedy.185

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. (quoting Mayerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 864 (D. Ariz. 1981)).
See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 6–7.
544 U.S. 113 (2005).
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (2006)).
See Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 118.
Id. at 121.
See id. at 115–16.
See id. at 116.
See id.
See id. at 122–23.
See id.
See id. at 127.
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2. Preclusion of § 1983 Claims To Enforce
Federal Constitutional Rights
While the plaintiffs in Sea Clammers and Ranchos Palos Verdes sought
to enforce federal statutory rights via § 1983,186 the Supreme Court has also
confronted the issue of preclusion when plaintiffs use § 1983 to enforce
federal constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court applied the implied preclusion doctrine for the first
time in a case to enforce federal constitutional rights in Smith v. Robinson.187 In Smith, the Supreme Court rejected a § 1983 claim when it inferred that Congress intended the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975188 (EHA) to provide an exclusive remedy. The plaintiff, an
eight-year-old suffering from cerebral palsy and several other disabilities,
claimed that he was denied the right to secure a free appropriate public education because of his disabilities.189 The plaintiff sought relief under two
statutes—the EHA and the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978190—and under the Constitution.191
The lower courts ruled for the plaintiff on his EHA claim, but because the
EHA did not provide for attorney’s fees, the plaintiff sought attorney’s fees
on the basis of his § 1983 claims.192
The Court recognized that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims were based on violations of constitutional rights, not alleged violations of the EHA.193
However, the Court acknowledged, “The EHA is a comprehensive scheme
. . . to aid the States in complying with their constitutional obligations to
provide public education for handicapped children.”194 The Smith Court
observed that the EHA’s legislative history and provisions reflected that the
statute was designed to address constitutional issues.195 Specifically, the
EHA stated that its purpose was “to ensure equal protection of the law”196
and that during its enactment, it was the “‘intent of the Committee to establish and protect the right to education for all handicapped children and to
provide assistance to the States in carrying out their responsibilities under
State law and the Constitution of the United States to provide equal protec-

186. See supra notes 172–85 and accompanying text.
187. 468 U.S. 992 (1984); see Levinson, supra note 169, at 783 (noting that the Supreme
Court took the implied congressional foreclosure doctrine “one step further” in Smith by applying it to constitutional claims).
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006). The EHA was later modified and renamed the Individuals
with Disabilities Act (IDEA). See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141–42.
189. Smith, 468 U.S. at 994–95.
190. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
191. Smith, 468 U.S. at 999–1000 (noting that the petitioners sought relief under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
192. See id. at 1003–05.
193. See id. at 1008–09.
194. Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
195. See id. at 1010.
196. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6) (2006).
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tion of the laws.’”197 In this way, the EHA could be considered a statute
intended to protect constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that “Congress intended the EHA to be
the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed special education.”198 Once again, the
Court reiterated that the key consideration when assessing an issue of preclusion is “what Congress intended.”199 First, the Court interpreted the
constitutional claims as too similar to the statutory claim under the EHA.200
Also, the Court found it unbelievable that Congress would have created a
comprehensive scheme in the EHA while leaving the door open to equal
protection claims via § 1983.201
3. A Key Distinction in Preclusion Cases
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on implied preclusion doctrine, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,202 clarified the standard
for finding preclusion of § 1983 claims by explicitly recognizing a key distinction among previous cases regarding preclusion.203 In cases where the
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleges a violation of a right conferred by a statute,
“evidence of such congressional intent may be found directly in the statute
creating the right, or inferred from the statute’s creation of a comprehensive
enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under
§ 1983.”204 This may apply in a case where a litigant asserts a § 1983 claim
to enforce rights created by the ADEA.
In contrast, when the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is based on a constitutional
violation, “lack of congressional intent may be inferred from a comparison
of the rights and protections of the statute and those existing under the Constitution.”205 Thus, if the rights and protections under the statute are different than those that exist under the Constitution, it is correct to infer that
Congress did not intend to foreclose § 1983 suits.206 This framework may
apply in cases where the litigant asserts a § 1983 claim to enforce a right
with an independent source in the Constitution.
197. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1010 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 13 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1437).
198. Id. at 1009.
199. Id. at 1012.
200. See id. at 1009.
201. See id. at 1011–12.
202. 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
203. See Timothy Davis & Kevin E. Smith, Eradicating Student-Athlete Sexual Assault of
Women: Section 1983 and Personal Liability Following Fitzgerald v. Barnstable, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 629, 640 (noting the Fitzgerald Court’s recognition of the “dissimilarity
between the rights and protections afforded under a statute and those afforded by the Constitution”); Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court § 1983 Decisions—October 2008 Term, 45
TULSA L. REV. 231, 241 (2009) (“The Court drew an important distinction between the enforcement of federal statutory rights under § 1983 and enforcement of federal constitutional
rights.”).
204. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 251.
205. Id. at 252.
206. See id. at 252–55.
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In reflecting on previous implied preclusion cases, including Sea
Clammers, the Supreme Court recognized that it had “placed primary emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute’s remedial scheme.”207 However, the Fitzgerald court further refined the implied preclusion doctrine by
including a comparison of the rights and protections guaranteed under the
Equal Protection Clause.208 In this way, the Fitzgerald court held that the
focus of the implied preclusion inquiry was not limited solely to the “nature
and extent of that statute’s remedial scheme”; rather, the “divergent coverage” of the statute in comparison to the constitutional claim is also part of
the calculus.209 Applying this test, the Fitzgerald court found that Congress
did not intend for Title IX to preclude § 1983 claims because the protections of Title IX are in some ways broader and in other ways narrower than
those guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause.210
H. Presumption Against Implicit Statutory Repeals
The implied preclusion doctrine must function alongside another wellestablished principle—the presumption against implicit statutory repeals.
Under this canon of statutory interpretation, “[i]n the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.”211 If there is no such affirmative showing, and the statutes
may coexist together, a court is “not at liberty to pick and choose among
congressional enactments.”212 Rather, the court should find that each statute remains in effect, and the later statute did not impliedly repeal the earlier statute.213 In making this analysis, courts should look to the language
and the legislative history of the later statute as an indication of congressional intent to repeal.214 The presumption against implicit statutory repeals is not necessarily at odds with the implied preclusion doctrine. To
harmonize these doctrines, a court must find “clear repugnancy” between
the earlier and later statutes before concluding that Congress intended to
preclude a previously enacted statute.215
II. THE CONFLICT OVER ADEA PRECLUSION OF § 1983 CLAIMS
Part II of this Note details the conflict between the U.S. Courts of Appeals and lower district courts regarding whether the ADEA is the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination claims. Courts differ as to whether the legislative history and purpose of the ADEA weighs in favor of finding preclu-

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 253.
See id. at 256.
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 256.
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974).
Id. at 551.
See id.
See id. at 550.
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988).
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sion. This Part addresses each court’s decision on the issue of ADEA exclusivity in turn.
A. Courts Finding That the ADEA Precludes § 1983 Claims
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have held that
ADEA precludes equal protection–based age discrimination claims brought
under § 1983. This section focuses on the analyses of the preclusion issue
by these courts.
1. The Fourth Circuit: Zombro v. Baltimore City
Police Department
In Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department,216 the Fourth Circuit
held that the ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for age discrimination
claims.217 James Zombro, a forty-five year old police officer with the Baltimore City Police Department, sued his employer in federal court, alleging
that the police department discriminated against him on the basis of his age
when it transferred him to a job of lesser status.218 Zombro brought a claim
under § 1983 because more than six months had elapsed since his transfer,219 well beyond the time limit for filing a charge with the EEOC.220
This delay foreclosed the possibility of bringing suit under the ADEA, although Zombro’s age discrimination claim otherwise would have fallen
squarely within the scope of the statute’s provisions. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding in favor of the Police Department, but it reached this holding on different grounds. The Fourth Circuit
held that Zombro could not bring a § 1983 claim for violation of his rights
under the Equal Protection Clause because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.221
The Fourth Circuit first described the ADEA’s remedial framework that
includes an administrative process through the EEOC.222 According to the
Fourth Circuit, this framework was “structured to facilitate and encourage
compliance through an informal process of conciliation and mediation.”223
The Fourth Circuit was especially concerned that if plaintiffs could resort to
§ 1983 claims, the administrative process would be totally undermined.224

216. 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989).
217. See id. at 1369.
218. See id. at 1365–66.
219. See Colleen Gale Tremi, Note, Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department: Pushing Plaintiffs Down the ADEA Path in Age Discrimination Suits, 68 N.C. L. REV. 995, 996 &
nn.12–13 (1990).
220. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring a charge alleging unlawful discrimination be filed with the EEOC “within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred”
in order to bring a civil action).
221. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369.
222. See id. at 1366.
223. Id.
224. See id.

356

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Applying the implied preclusion doctrine,225 the Fourth Circuit found
that the ADEA is such a “precisely drawn, detailed statute”226 that it manifests congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims.227 Even though
Zombro’s § 1983 claim was wholly predicated on the violation of his constitutional rights, rather than a violation of rights created by the ADEA, this
did not matter to the Fourth Circuit.228 The court predicted that it was
probably “unusual” for plaintiffs to bring claims of age discrimination via
§ 1983 as violations of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause,229 but
nevertheless, it found that the policy of precluding § 1983 claims when
Congress has provided a comprehensive statutory scheme applies with
equal force in cases where a plaintiff brings a wholly constitutional claim
using § 1983.230 According to the Fourth Circuit, a comprehensive statute
should preclude § 1983 claims unless the legislative history and structure
show intent to allow § 1983 claims to coexist with claims under the statute.231
Turning to the language and legislative history of the ADEA, the Zombro
court concluded that neither the text nor the legislative history suggest congressional intent to allow § 1983 claims to coexist with claims under the
statute.232 According to the text of the ADEA, its provisions “shall be enforced in accordance with . . . section[] 216.”233 Section 216 is part of the
FLSA,234 a statute that has also been interpreted to be the exclusive remedy
for rights it confers.235 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit found it “implausible that Congress would have intended to preserve the private cause of action under § 1983 for age discrimination when that cause of action would
severely undermine, if not debilitate, the enforcement mechanism created
by Congress under the ADEA.”236
The Zombro court also expressed particular concern over the effect of allowing § 1983 age discrimination claims to proceed against government
employers.237 Because government employers—especially a police department like the defendant in Zombro—must be given “wide[] latitude”238
to manage their own affairs and dispatch and reassign employees as needed,
the Fourth Circuit argued that allowing § 1983 claims against government
225. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text. This standard states that when a
particular statute provides sufficiently comprehensive remedies, the comprehensiveness may
suffice to demonstrate Congress’s intent to preclude § 1983 claims as an alternative remedy.
226. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369.
227. See id. at 1368.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 1367. The fact that other plaintiffs have based their claims of age discrimination on the Constitution rather than the ADEA may call this assessment into doubt. See infra
Parts II.A.ii–II.B.
230. See Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1368–69.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006).
234. Id. §§ 201–219.
235. See Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
236. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369.
237. See id. at 1369–70.
238. See id. at 1370 (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974)).
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employers would be especially troublesome. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that “in the light of the existence of comprehensive ADEA remedies, the employer-employee relationship in this case—involving police
discipline, morale and public safety—is a special factor that counsels hesitation in recognizing a constitutional cause of action absent affirmative contrary indications from Congress.”239
Following this lengthy discussion of the exclusivity of the ADEA, the
Fourth Circuit also held that “Zombro’s claim as asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment, based upon alleged discriminatory transfer, [was] not
justiciable.”240 The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the elderly are not a suspect class in need of special protection that would necessitate “strict judicial scrutiny.”241 Absent discrimination based on race, sex, or an employee’s exercise of his or her First
Amendment rights, the Zombro court was not prepared to “intervene on
constitutional grounds in the hiring, discharge, or promotion of public employees.”242
2. The Ninth Circuit: Ahlmeyer v. Nevada
System of Higher Education
After the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zombro, the Ninth Circuit also held
that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims in
Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher Education.243 Plaintiff Linda
Ahlmeyer sued her employer, the Nevada System of Higher Education, after she was denied certain privileges of employment.244 In particular,
Ahlmeyer, who was over forty years old, was denied an assistant and was
not allowed to take classes during work time, unlike her younger coworkers.245 Ahlmeyer also alleged that her employer punished her for actions
for which younger employees were not reprimanded.246 Ahlmeyer brought
a claim under the ADEA in the district court, which was dismissed based on
qualified immunity grounds.247 In response, Ahlmeyer moved to amend her
claim, instead asserting an age discrimination claim under § 1983.248 The
district court denied the motion to amend and entered an order dismissing
her claims with prejudice.249
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ADEA precludes § 1983
claims. The Ninth Circuit first observed that all other circuit courts that
considered the issue had, at that time, held that ADEA was the exclusive
239.
240.
241.
242.
1979)).
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1370 (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976)).
Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1371 (quoting Clarke v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.
555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 1054.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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remedy for claims of age discrimination in the workplace.250 Of those circuit court decisions, the Ninth Circuit found the Zombro decision especially
persuasive.251 Citing additional federal appellate court decisions that
reached the same conclusion, the Ninth Circuit decided to follow in the path
of its sister circuit courts and hold that the ADEA provides the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination claims.252
The Ninth Circuit was therefore not persuaded by the reasoning of district courts, such as the court in Mummelthie v. City of Mason City.253
There, the Northern District of Iowa rejected Zombro and held that the
ADEA does not preclude § 1983 claims because of the presumption against
implied preclusion and the distinction between applying implied preclusion
when considering constitutional versus statutory claims.254 Responding to
the Mummelthie court’s reliance on the presumption against implied preclusion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the implied preclusion doctrine represents an exception to that presumption.255 As to the Mummelthie court’s
distinction between applying the implied preclusion doctrine in the context
of constitutional claims versus statutory claims, the Ninth Circuit responded
that the implied preclusion doctrine applies when the constitutional claim
and statutory claim are virtually identical.256 In its application of the implied preclusion doctrine, the Ninth Circuit found that the ADEA represents
the type of comprehensive remedial scheme that evidences Congress’s intent for it to be an exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination in the
workplace.257
The Ninth Circuit also found the differences between Title VII and the
ADEA significant enough to warrant the conclusion that the availability of
§ 1983 claims to enforce Title VII has no bearing on the ADEA.258 Instead,
the Ninth Circuit found that the remedial provisions of the ADEA are most
relevant to the subject of preclusion.259 The Ninth Circuit found it significant that the remedial provisions of the ADEA do not mirror Title VII. Instead, the ADEA’s remedial provisions incorporate provisions of the FLSA,
which does provide the exclusive remedy for claims arising under its provisions.260 The ADEA’s divergence from Title VII on the issue of remedies
convinced the Ninth Circuit not to make § 1983 claims available to ADEA
plaintiffs as they are available to Title VII plaintiffs.261 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit did not find it significant that aggrieved older workers asserting

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See id. at 1056–57.
See id.
See id. at 1057.
873 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Iowa 1995); see infra Part II.B.ii.1.
Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1057.
See id. at 1057–58.
See id. at 1058.
See id.
See id. at 1058–59.
See id. at 1059.
See id. at 1058–59.
See id. at 1059–69.

2013]

A NEW SPLIT ON OLD AGE

359

claims against state employers would not have a remedy in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kimel.262
3. The First, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits:
Following Suit
In keeping with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zombro, the First,263
Fifth,264 Tenth,265 and D.C.266 Circuits have also held that the ADEA is an
exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims. These decisions, however,
did little to enhance or refine the case law on the issue of ADEA exclusivity, as the courts in these decisions merely relied on Zombro without engaging in much independent analysis. For example, in Chennareddy v.
Bowsher,267 the D.C. Circuit assumed that the ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims by citing Zombro.268 The D.C.
Circuit engaged in no analysis of its own regarding the issue of § 1983 preclusion, stating only, “It is undisputed that the ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for a federal employee who claims age discrimination.”269
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit in Migneault merely cited Zombro and Lafleur
in support of this conclusion, citing “numerous, well-founded reasons,”
which the court declined to repeat and on which it did not elaborate.270
B. A New Circuit Split: Courts Finding That the ADEA
Does Not Preclude § 1983 Claims
The Seventh Circuit, along with several district courts, have held that the
ADEA does not preclude equal protection–based age discrimination claims
brought under § 1983. This section focuses on the holdings of these courts.
1. The Seventh Circuit: Levin v. Madigan
Recently, in Levin v. Madigan,271 the Seventh Circuit held that the
ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age discrimination and, therefore,
does not preclude a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on age discrimination in the workplace.272
Plaintiff Harvey N. Levin was employed as an Illinois assistant attorney
general until his termination on May 12, 2006.273 During his tenure, Levin

262. See id. at 1060 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2006))
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims under the ADEA against state actors).
263. Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 2003).
264. Lafleur v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1997).
265. Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000).
266. Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
267. 935 F.2d at 315.
268. See id. at 318.
269. Id.
270. Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1140.
271. 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012).
272. See id. at 617.
273. See id. at 609.
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consistently performed to his employer’s satisfaction, as indicated by his
yearly performance evaluations.274 When he was terminated, however, his
employer alleged that he displayed poor litigation skills and judgment, and
that he socialized too much.275 Levin was over sixty years of age when he
was fired, and his employer subsequently replaced him with an attorney in
her thirties.276 Younger attorneys were also hired to replace two of Levin’s
colleagues, who were also over age forty.277
Levin sued the Office of the Illinois Attorney General, a state government organization, and his supervisors in their individual capacities, asserting claims of age discrimination under both the ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause by way of § 1983.278 On appeal, the individual defendants
asserted qualified immunity from damages for the equal protection claim
and further asserted that the ADEA was the exclusive remedy for claims of
age discrimination in employment.279
The Northern District of Illinois held that Levin was not an “employee”
within the meaning of the ADEA.280 The district court also went on to say
that the ADEA did not foreclose Levin’s § 1983 claim, and furthermore,
Levin’s employer was not entitled to qualified immunity on Levin’s age
discrimination claim under § 1983, because the individual defendants
should have known that they were violating a clearly established constitutional right.281 The district court so concluded because the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly prohibits arbitrary age discrimination; therefore, qualified immunity was inapplicable.282
In deciding the issue of § 1983 preclusion raised on appeal, the Seventh
Circuit first considered the applicable standard for finding preclusion of
§ 1983 claims.283 While recognizing the implied preclusion doctrine,284 the
Seventh Circuit observed that the Supreme Court “does not ‘lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy’
for the deprivation of a federal right.”285 To determine whether a statutory
scheme precludes a § 1983 equal protection claim, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “the most important consideration is congressional intent.”286
This may be construed from the statutory language, the legislative history,
the nature and extent of the remedial scheme, and a comparison of the rights
and protections afforded by the statutory scheme versus a § 1983 claim.287
274.
275.
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277.
278.
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280.
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282.
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284.
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287.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 610.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 611–17.
See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
Levin, 692 F.3d at 613 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)).
Id. at 615.
See id.
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The Seventh Circuit highlighted a critical difference between two types of
Supreme Court cases analyzing the implied preclusion doctrine; it carefully
distinguished those cases where the plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim to enforce a right under the statute in question from other cases where a plaintiff
uses § 1983 to enforce independently sourced rights, such as those arising
under the Constitution.288
Turning to the issue of whether the ADEA precludes a § 1983 claim, the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that all other circuit courts that had addressed the issue of § 1983 preclusion held that the ADEA is the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination claims.289 Recognizing that this was “admittedly a close call, especially in light of the conflicting decisions from our
sister circuits,” the Seventh Circuit nevertheless held that the ADEA is not
the exclusive remedy.290
The Seventh Circuit’s first reason for this conclusion was that “[n]othing
in the text of the ADEA expressly precludes a § 1983 claim or addresses
constitutional rights.”291 The Seventh Circuit interpreted congressional silence on preclusion not as an indication of exclusivity, as the Zombro court
did, but rather as evidence that Congress perhaps did not even consider the
issue of exclusivity.292 To the Seventh Circuit, congressional silence did
not reveal that Congress intended for the ADEA to preclude such constitutional age discrimination claims.293 The Seventh Circuit added that a finding of preclusion requires “more . . . than a comprehensive statutory
scheme.” 294 Therefore, the ADEA’s remedial scheme, though comprehensive, was not enough for the Seventh Circuit to imply preclusion in the absence of a clear congressional indication. 295 This approach followed the
Supreme Court’s admonition that “‘repeals by implication are not favored
and will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is
clear and manifest.’”296
The Seventh Circuit also found it significant that the rights and protections provided by the ADEA are not the same as those afforded by an equal
protection claim under § 1983.297 The Seventh Circuit distinguished prior
cases finding preclusion of § 1983 claims on the basis that the statutory
schemes at issue “were specifically designed to address constitutional issues,” whereas the ADEA does not provide a remedy for constitutional
rights and only enforces rights created by the ADEA itself.298 Moreover, a
288. See id. at 612 (“While the plaintiffs in Sea Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes
sought to assert federal statutory rights under § 1983, two other Supreme Court cases have
examined whether a plaintiff is precluded from asserting constitutional rights under § 1983
when a remedial statutory scheme also exists.”).
289. See id. at 616.
290. Id. at 617.
291. Id.
292. See id. at 617–18.
293. See id.
294. Id. at 619.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 618 (quoting Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799 (2010)).
297. See id. at 621.
298. Id.
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plaintiff may only sue the employer, employment agency, or labor organization under the ADEA.299 By contrast, under § 1983, a plaintiff may sue a
governmental organization, as well as individuals, for depriving him or her
of a constitutional right.300 Additionally, the ADEA prohibits certain individuals for bringing a claim under the statute; specifically, elected officials,
law enforcement officers, or firefighters cannot bring ADEA claims.301 In
comparison, § 1983 has no comparable limits on claims by certain individuals.302 Finally, the Seventh Circuit noted that state employees have no
damages remedy under the ADEA because damages claims are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment; therefore, preclusion of § 1983 claims would
leave state employees without a federal damages remedy.303
Based on the foregoing, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Levin’s
§ 1983 equal protection claim was not foreclosed by the ADEA. Turning
then to the issue of qualified immunity, the Seventh Circuit held that age
discrimination is a clearly established violation of the Equal Protection
Clause under Kimel. Therefore, the individual defendants, as state actors,
were not entitled to qualified immunity.304
2. Northern District of Iowa:
Mummelthie v. City of Mason City
In Mummelthie,305 the Northern District of Iowa306 held that the ADEA
does not preclude § 1983 claims for age discrimination.307 The City of Mason City, Iowa, had employed plaintiff Carol A. Mummelthie, aged fiftyfive, as a clerk and word processor operator.308 Mummelthie sued her employer for its failure to promote her to the position of Deputy City Clerk, a
decision she claimed was motivated by discrimination due to her age.309
Mummelthie did not timely file a claim with the EEOC, one of the preconditions for suit under the ADEA. As a result, she brought a § 1983 claim
alleging age discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.310
The Mummelthie court acknowledged that “the great weight of recent authority” had held that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment.311 The court did find, however, that there were
flaws in the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Zombro, the leading case of those
finding preclusion.312 Specifically, the court said, “Although the court in
299.
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301.
302.
303.
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307.
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See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006)).
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See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(j), 630(f)).
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See id. at 622.
873 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
The Northern District of Iowa sits in the Eighth Circuit.
Mummelthie, 873 F. Supp. at 1322–23.
See id. at 1308–09.
See id. at 1309–10.
See id. at 1312.
Id. at 1317.
See id. at 1317–19.
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Zombro considered legislative intent in arriving at its ruling, it did so via
the ‘Sea Clammers doctrine,’ inferring legislative intent based on its examination of the comprehensiveness of the ADEA, and not by examining the
actual legislative history of the act.”313 This was a fundamental flaw according to the court in Mummelthie, so it engaged in its own analysis of the
language and legislative history of the ADEA.314 To the Mummelthie court,
the language of the ADEA does not suggest in any way that Congress intended to preclude claims for relief under § 1983.315
The Mummlethie court’s holding was also based in part on its comparison
of the ADEA to Title VII, which does not preclude § 1983 claims.316 For
example, both statutes were amended to give state and local government
employees causes of action.317 During a hearing preceding the 1972
amendment to Title VII, Senator Lloyd Bentsen stated that “those principles
underlying the provisions in the EEOC bill (extending Title VII to state and
local employees) are directly applicable to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.”318 According to the Mummelthie court, Senator Bentsen’s
reference to “principles” included the idea that § 1983 claims would be retained after the passage of the 1972 amendment to Title VII.319 Because the
Supreme Court and other courts relied on Senator Bentsen’s comments as
evidence of congressional intent in enacting the ADEA amendments two
years later in 1974, the Mummelthie court concluded that the natural inference was that § 1983 claims should be retained under the ADEA as well.320
3. District of Nebraska: Mustafa v. Nebraska Department
of Correctional Services
In Mustafa v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services,321 plaintiff
Vernon Mustafa, aged approximately fifty, claimed his employer discriminated against him based on his age in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.322 Mustafa also claimed his employer engaged in racial and religious discrimination and retaliation.323 Instead of relying on the ADEA, Mustafa brought his claim for age discrimination under § 1983.324 In its analysis of the exclusivity of the ADEA, the
District of Nebraska325 noted that finding the ADEA to preclude § 1983
313. Id. at 1319.
314. See id. at 1323–29.
315. See id. at 1325.
316. See id. at 1320–21.
317. See id. at 1325 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat.
74 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b))).
318. Mummelthie, 873 F. Supp. at 1325 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 15,895 (1972)).
319. See id. at 1325.
320. See id. at 1325–36 (citing Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 166–67 nn.14–15
(1981); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Elrod,
674 F.2d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 1972)).
321. 196 F. Supp. 2d 945 (D. Neb. 2002).
322. See id. at 949–50.
323. See id. at 950.
324. See id. at 955.
325. The District of Nebraska sits in the Eighth Circuit.
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claims would have the practical effect of eliminating all age discrimination
claims against state actors, because the Eleventh Amendment bars claims
under the ADEA against states.326 Aggrieved state employees claiming age
discrimination against a state actor would therefore suffer from a “remedial
vacuum,” as they would be left without an available federal forum.327 The
Mustafa court found the 1974 amendments to the ADEA significant, as extending the ADEA’s coverage to state and local governments showed congressional intent to provide a remedy for age discrimination against state
employers.328 Finally, the Mustafa court relied on the presumption against
implied repeal to reach its conclusion.329
4. Southern District of New York: Shapiro v.
New York City Department of Education
In Shapiro v. New York City Department of Education,330 the Southern
District of New York331 decided against finding preclusion of § 1983
claims by the ADEA.332 Previously, the Second Circuit had declined to
hold that Title VII preempted a § 1983 claim for gender discrimination in
Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital.333 The Shapiro court saw no
reason to treat the ADEA, a sister statute of Title VII, differently than Title
VII in this respect.334 Thus, the Shapiro court concluded that “the weight
of authority in the Second Circuit favors the position that the ADEA does
not preempt claims under § 1983 for age discrimination.”335
III. AGAINST PRECLUSION: ADOPTING THE APPROACH
OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
When the Supreme Court attempts to resolve this circuit split in its upcoming term, it should find that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for
age discrimination, as the Seventh Circuit found in Levin. Part III examines
the implied preclusion doctrine in the wake of Fitzgerald,336 followed by an
analysis of the divergent rights and protections guaranteed under the ADEA
and the Constitution. This Part then contends that the text and legislative
history of the ADEA, along with the presumption against implied statutory
repeals, weigh against a finding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for
age discrimination claims. Finally, this Part argues that Title VII is more
useful as a comparison than the FLSA on the issue of preclusion, and this

326. See Mustafa, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
327. Id. at 956.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. 561 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
331. The Southern District of New York sits in the Second Circuit.
332. See Shapiro, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 419–20.
333. 4 F.3d 134, 143–44 (2d Cir. 1993).
334. See Shapiro, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
335. Id. at 420 (quoting Donlon v. Bd. of Educ., No. 06-CV-6027T, 2007 WL 4553932,
at *3 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007)).
336. See supra notes 166–207 and accompanying text.
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comparison opposes a finding of exclusivity, regardless of arguable differences between the nature of age and race discrimination.
A. The Impact of Fitzgerald Calls into Doubt Circuit Court
Decisions Upholding ADEA Exclusivity
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the implied preclusion
doctrine, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, represents a significant development in the implied preclusion doctrine.337 For the first time,
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized a key distinction among claims
brought under § 1983: those that are based on rights conferred under a statutory scheme, versus those that are based on rights conferred under the
Constitution.338 Furthermore, the Court in Fitzgerald expanded the exclusivity inquiry. What was once a one-sided focus on the extent of a statute’s
remedial scheme was broadened to include an assessment of the instances
where the protections under the statute and under the Equal Protection
Clause diverge.339
The Zombro decision predates Fitzgerald by two decades.340 When the
Fourth Circuit reached its conclusion in Zombro that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims, it applied the implied preclusion doctrine, as it existed at that time.341 In other words, the Fourth Circuit
only had the benefit of Sea Clammers and Smith, in which the Court did not
highlight nor explain this key distinction.342 The Fourth Circuit’s failure to
meaningfully confront this distinction represents a significant error. In fact,
the Fourth Circuit simply dismissed the argument that such a distinction
was meaningful, noting instead that constitutionally based age discrimination claims under § 1983 were probably “unusual.”343 In light of the number of cases raising this issue since the Zombro decision,344 this characterization has not proven accurate.
Had the Fourth Circuit, or any of the circuit courts following its lead,
evaluated the issue of ADEA exclusivity in the wake of Fitzgerald, it is
likely that these courts would have agreed with the Seventh Circuit in Levin,345 and would have concluded that the ADEA does not preclude age discrimination claims brought via § 1983.

337. See supra Part I.G.iii.
338. See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
340. The Fourth Circuit decided Zombro in 1989, while the Supreme Court handed down
the Fitzgerald decision in 2009. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246
(2009); Zombro v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364, 1367 (4th Cir. 1989).
341. See supra notes 226–31 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 187–201 and accompanying text.
343. See Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1367.
344. See supra Part II.
345. See supra notes 283–304 and accompanying text.
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1. Divergence: A Comparison of Rights and Protections
Weighs Against ADEA Exclusivity
Fitzgerald also advanced the implied preclusion doctrine by adding that
an appropriate measure of exclusivity involves a comparison between the
rights and protections under a statutory scheme and those conferred under
the Constitution.346 In a comparison between a claim brought under ADEA
and a § 1983 equal protection claim, the rights and remedies diverge.347
For example, under the ADEA, an aggrieved older worker may only sue his
employer, employment agency, or a labor organization.348 If, however, the
worker brings a § 1983 suit, the worker may sue any individual, so long as
that individual caused the deprivation of that worker’s federally guaranteed
right while acting under the color of state law.349
Additionally, claims under the ADEA are limited in other ways that
§ 1983 claims are not. For example, the ADEA prohibits an individual
younger than forty years of age from bringing reverse age discrimination
claims.350 Also, certain individuals are barred from bringing a claim under
the ADEA, including elected officials, certain members of elected officials’
staff, law enforcement officers, or firefighters.351 And state employees,
such as Levin, would be left in a “remedial vacuum” under the ADEA because of Eleventh Amendment immunity for state employers.352 Section
1983 claims are not similarly limited and provide a federal damages remedy
to state employees who would be otherwise without a remedy.
In many significant ways, therefore, claims allowed under the ADEA diverge from those framed as § 1983 equal protection claims. The principle
elucidated in Fitzgerald, that divergence suggests congressional intent not
to preclude § 1983 claims, applies with full force in the context of the
ADEA as well. Therefore, the ADEA should not be interpreted to preclude
constitutional age discrimination claims under § 1983.
2. The Language and Legislative History of the ADEA
Do Not Compel a Finding of Preclusion
Congressional intent has uniformly been the key inquiry in deciding the
issue of a statute’s exclusivity.353 To find preclusion, the ADEA should reflect express congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims or, alternatively, be framed in such a way that it could not coexist with a § 1983 claim.354
However, the text of the ADEA is silent on the issue of constitutional rights

346. See supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 297–303 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
350. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 593 (2004).
351. See Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 2012).
352. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91–92 (2000); supra notes 158–63
and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
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under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.355 Nothing in the text of the ADEA expressly forecloses the possibility of bringing
a § 1983 claim, nor does the ADEA address constitutional rights.356
The legislative history of the ADEA equally lacks persuasive evidence of
exclusivity. First, there is no explicit legislative history indicating congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims. While the Zombro court and its
progeny have interpreted the lack of legislative history as congressional intent not to allow § 1983 claims,357 this is not persuasive. Silence on the issue of § 1983 or constitutional rights does not indicate that Congress ever
considered the issue of preclusion. At the time of the ADEA’s enactment,
however, the constitutional right to be free from age discrimination by state
actors was recognized and enforced.358 Congress did not express any disapproval of such constitutional challenges. In such circumstances, if Congress had intended the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims, one might expect that Congress would have explicitly
addressed the issue of preclusion. Moreover, knowing that litigants were
bringing equal protection–based age discrimination claims under § 1983,
Congress amended the ADEA to expand its coverage. From this, it can be
inferred that Congress was seeking to make effective remedies for age discrimination claims more readily available. Removing a federal remedy for
age discrimination runs counter to that purpose.
B. The Presumption Against Repeal of Legislation by Implication
Disfavors Finding ADEA Exclusivity
The Supreme Court stated in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment
and Housing Authority359 that it would not “‘lightly conclude that Congress
intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy’ for the deprivation of
a federally secured right.”360 The Fourth Circuit’s application of the implied preclusion doctrine in Zombro is in tension with this statement as well
as a well-established principle, the presumption against implicit statutory
repeals.361 In Zombro, the Fourth Circuit’s application of the implied preclusion doctrine is predicated on the concept that Congress’s enactment of a
statute containing a comprehensive remedial scheme compels the conclusion that Congress repealed all existing remedies for violations of rights
similar to those created under the statute.362 The Fourth Circuit reached
this conclusion despite the absence of any explicit showing of such intent,363 as required by the presumption against repeals of legislation by implication.364 The issue remains whether “the earlier and later statutes are
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See supra Part I.B.iv.
See supra Part I.B.iv.
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479 U.S. 418 (1987).
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irreconcilable.”365 An ADEA claim and a § 1983 equal protection–based
age discrimination claim are not irreconcilable, as a comparison of the
rights and protections provided under each are not the same.366 Thus, the
ADEA and § 1983 may coexist, and invoking the implied preclusion doctrine to implicitly repeal § 1983 claims is inappropriate.
C. Title VII Analogy: Interpretations of Title VII
Should Apply to the ADEA
A finding that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy has support not just
in the wake of the Fitzgerald holding, but also by analogy to its “sister statute,” Title VII.367 Although the ADEA imports some provisions of the
FLSA into its remedial scheme,368 courts should look to Title VII rather
than the FLSA when interpreting the exclusivity of the ADEA. Title VII
has been considered “the legislation which most closely parallels the
ADEA.”369 The analogy between Title VII and the ADEA is wellrecognized as the statutes share important similarities in their overall purposes, substantive provisions, and their legislative histories. Because the
legislative history is a key part of applying the implied preclusion doctrine,
the logical conclusion would be to analogize the ADEA to the statute whose
legislative history is most pertinent. Title VII has been interpreted as coexisting with similar, yet alternative, § 1983 claims, so the same interpretation
should apply to the ADEA.
This conclusion is further supported by an examination of the weaknesses of the analogy between the ADEA and the FLSA in the context of the
preclusion issue. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Kelly v. Wauconda Park
District,370 “the connection of the ADEA amendment to the legislation enacting FLSA amendments was largely fortuitous.”371 Cases concerning
FLSA exclusivity only hold that the FLSA is the sole means of vindicating
rights conferred under the FLSA.372 Unlike Title VII, the FLSA does not
purport to create a right under the statute that was previously guaranteed by
the Constitution.373 As shown in Fitzgerald, the distinction between § 1983
claims to enforce federal statutory rights and those brought to enforce federal constitutional rights is significant.374 Therefore, applying the preclusion analysis of the FLSA, a statute for which there is no corresponding or
similar constitutional right, is illogical. Once again, the ADEA should

365. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (citing Georgia v. Penn. R.R. Co., 324
U.S. 439, 456–57 (1945)).
366. See supra notes 297–303 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
369. Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, 873 F. Supp. 1293, 1324 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
(quoting EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 1972)).
370. 801 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986).
371. Id. at 271 n.2 (quoting Elrod, 614 F.2d at 610).
372. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 202–05 and accompanying text.
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therefore be interpreted by analogy to Title VII, its “sister statute” for which
there is a corresponding constitutional right.
D. Making Sense of the Analogy Between Race Discrimination
and Age Discrimination in the Context of Preclusion
Even if one accepts the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, the
issue remains that the classes protected under the statutes are not interchangeable, and differences exist when comparing the nature of race discrimination and the nature of age discrimination.375 Because race discrimination and age discrimination are not necessarily interchangeable, one may
question whether this compels the conclusion that the ADEA must be treated differently than Title VII on the issue of exclusivity.
Even assuming that race and age discrimination are not interchangeable,
a comparison of the treatment of race and age as equal protection claims
and their effect on the statutory schemes gives weight to the argument that
the ADEA should not be interpreted to preclude § 1983 claims. When a litigant brings a claim under the Equal Protection Clause to contest a policy of
racial discrimination, the reviewing court must use strict scrutiny, the highest standard of review.376 A claim of race discrimination in employment as
an equal protection claim would likely be very attractive to litigants because
strict scrutiny is a very exacting standard of review. The racially discriminatory conduct would be unlikely to survive strict scrutiny analysis. Despite the attractiveness of bypassing the enforcement mechanisms provided
by Title VII, Congress was evidently willing to tolerate that risk which may
undermine Title VII’s statutory scheme.377
In contrast, age discrimination is subject to only rational basis review, the
lowest standard of review.378 Given that rational basis review is much less
stringent than strict scrutiny, it is unlikely that litigants alleging an equal
protection–based age discrimination claim would be successful. The fact
that age is not a suspect class and triggers only rational basis review means
that equal protection claims for age discrimination present little threat to the
statutory scheme of the ADEA. This perceived threat is a common thread
running throughout the decisions that conclude that the ADEA is an exclusive remedy,379 but the comparison between race and age reveals that this
fear is likely overstated.
CONCLUSION
There is a compelling need to enforce fully Congress’s intent to eliminate
age discrimination in the workplace in light of the increased number of age
discrimination charges with the EEOC and the increasing number of older
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men and women in the workforce.380 An alternative holding would create a
“remedial vacuum”381 for many state employees who would be left without
a federal damages remedy in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Kimel
that the ADEA does not provide an individual damages cause of action for a
state employee.382 Notably, the Zombro decision, along with most of the
other circuit court opinions finding that the ADEA is an exclusive remedy,
predate Kimel.383 The need to close that remedial gap is especially heightened in light of the Kimel decision and could not have factored into the reasoning of those courts that ruled that the ADEA is an exclusive remedy prior to Kimel. Armed with awareness of the gap created by Kimel, the
Supreme Court should elect to follow the Seventh Circuit’s approach in
Levin.
In a more general sense, courts should use caution when reviewing
whether a statutory scheme is exclusive and precludes § 1983 claims. Limiting the use of § 1983 claims seems counter to its purpose of protecting
newly expanded civil rights in the Reconstruction era.384 The significance
of § 1983 as an important safeguard of fundamental constitutional rights
continues to be recognized, as its continued prominence in civil litigation
suggests. Finding preclusion of § 1983 by implication curtails the statute’s
ability to further that purpose and may have ramifications for its applicability in other areas of fundamental rights. This is a consequence that courts
should weigh heavily and should not reach by implication.
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